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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TLS certificates fulfill two critical security functions.
First, the certificate plays a key role in authenticating
and verifying the identity of a host, client or application.

Key research findings include:
•

advertised on darknet and clearnet platforms, both

Second, it enables the encryption of data exchanged

as add-on services for web design projects and as

between a client and a server. To support the sensitive

standalone services.

operation of identity verification, SSL/TLS certificates are
supposed to be issued by trusted certificate authorities
(CAs) who verify and check that companies are legitimate

•

searchers were able to buy three certificates from two

website or service.

Research Group at the Andrew Young School of Policy

of the top 10 CAs operating in the U.S. and U.K.
•

legitimate government documents. Our researchers

detailed report, which offered evidence of the presence of

received legal documentation for nonexistent compa-

a steady supply of SSL/TLS certificates on several darknet

nies, including “Certificate of Incorporation of a Private

markets (Maimon et al. 2019). Specifically, we reported that

Limited Company” in the U.K. and “Certificate of

SSL/TLS certificates are offered for sale either as part of
websites and ransomware) or as a standalone product, at

Formation of a Limited Liability Company” in the U.S.
•

that sell them as part of a bundle, with prices for

of certificate and scope of additional services offered). In

standalone EV certificates retailing between $1,000–

these advertisements, several vendors offered Extended

$15,000, compared with $100–$400 for those sold as

Validation (EV) certificates for sale; these certificates

part of a package of web services.

require confirmation of the legal entity of the owner by a
of trust.

•

searchers tried to purchase an EV certificate bundled
with web services, but we received a DV certificate.

vendors were able to deliver on their promise to supply
vendors over various communication platforms between

•

$10,000–$15,000) than those offered for a retail

our findings from this intensive research effort and outlines

website (asking price ranges from $1,000–$1,500).

our insights.
•

operates across several countries and communicates

is problematic at best and has already been outsmarted

directly with CAs.

by organized crime groups that operate around the world
organizations.

At least one vendor selling EV certificates is working
with a sophisticated organized crime group, which

validate the true identity of companies and organizations

to issue EV certificates to nonexistent retail and financial

Obtaining certificates for financial services organizations is more costly (asking price ranges from

December 2018 and August 2019, and this report details

Our findings show that the process employed by CAs to

Dark web vendors providing EV certificates as a
standalone product are more likely to deliver. Our re-

As a next step, we wanted to explore whether darknet
EV certificates. To this end, we communicated with these

Dark web vendors offering EV certificates as standalone products charge more for them than those

prices ranging from $260 to $1,600 (depending on the type

designated CA and are designed to confer the highest level

Dark web vendors are tricking CAs by obtaining fraudulent documents and using this to obtain

Studies at Georgia State University and Venafi released a

crimeware services and products (for example, malicious

It is possible to buy valid EV certificates on the dark
web for completely fictional companies—our re-

in order to reduce the risk of fraud and establish trust in a

However, in March 2019, the Evidence-Based Cybersecurity

Posts that promise to deliver EV certificates are

•

Although a small number of certificates were purchased as part of this research, CA business processes
for evaluating identification documentation for EV
certificates appear to be consistent across the industry,
suggesting these tactics could be employed by a wide
range of dark web vendors.
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BACKGROUND
Encrypted Internet Communication, TLS

Certificate Authorities’ Issuing Process

Certificates and Certificate Authorities

of EV Certificates

Internet communication between clients’ devices

In an effort to understand CAs’ issuing processes of EV

and servers is governed by various communication

certificates, we contacted 11 leading CAs—six of the

protocols. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), for

top 10 in the U.S. and five of the top 10 in the U.K.—via

example, defines how messages should be formatted

phone and asked them to walk us through their verification

and transmitted between computers connected to the

process before issuing EV certificates.

internet and determines how applications and web
servers should communicate and respond to queries.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is
the secure version of HTTP. This protocol encrypts the
internet traffic between clients’ browsers and the web
servers they access, using one of two secure protocols:
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security
(TLS). Both protocols use an “asymmetric” Public Key

CAs are required to follow a set of industry guidelines issued
by the CA/Browser Forum that detail the identification
process.2 Figure 1 describes the various stages of the
verification process. These are the steps taken by CAs and
EV certificate applicants during each of stage of this process:
1.

Online Application: Purchasers are required to complete
online forms and provide basic information, including:

Infrastructure (PKI) system to provide confidential,
encrypted communication between clients and servers
by binding a “public” key and a “private” key (Kim et al.
2017). Anything encrypted with the public key can only be

•

The full registered name of the company

•

Physical address of the company in the country
where the certificate is to be registered

decrypted by the private key, and vice versa.
•

To facilitate confidential communications with clients,

purchasing the certificate

organizations need to install SSL or TLS certificates onto
their web servers. These certificates bind together two

•

important components: either a domain or server name

the padlock, and the HTTPS protocol allows secure

Details to verify that the requesting individual
works for the purchasing organization (such as a

with an organizational identity and location. When installed
on a web server, the SSL or TLS certificate activates

Direct contact information for the individual

letter from HR confirming employment)
2.

Organizational Authentication: Once the request has

connections from a web server to a browser.

been submitted to the CA, the CA confirms that

To support the sensitive operation of identity verification,

either through a search for official documentation

the information provided is correct. This can be done

SSL/TLS certificates and their corresponding public and

(such as articles of incorporation or chartered

private encryption keys are issued by trusted CAs. CAs

licenses) or, in the U.S., through a Professional Opinion

are charged with the task of employing various validation
processes for different types of SSL/TLS certificates:
Domain (DV), Organization (OV) and Extended (EV). DV
and OV certificates require minimal validation while EV
certificates require more extensive validation to ensure
these higher-value certificates are issued only to legitimate
companies, organizations and individuals.

Letter (POL) from an attorney.
3.

Operational Existence: In addition to legal documentation,
most CAs also cross-check the information submitted
by the requester against a reputable, third-party
database (such as Dun & Bradstreet or Bloomberg) to
confirm that the organization is currently operational.
In the U.S., CAs also verify the organization has been
operational for at least six months (this is also verified
through a third-party database).
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4.

Physical Address and Telephone Number: The CA

•

Admin@YourDomainName.com

cross-references the information given against official

•

Administrator@YourDomainName.com

government databases, such as Company House in

•

Webmaster@YourDomainName.com

the U.K. or state or municipal registers in the U.S.,

•

Hostmaster@YourDomainName.com

to confirm that the physical address and telephone

•

Postmaster@YourDomainName.com

number provided are correct.
5.

6.

Verification Call: Finally the CA will call the purchasing

Domain Ownership: Purchasers are required to prove

individual at the number provided and reconfirm all of

they are the legal owners of the domain they are

the information provided is correct.

seeking to get certified. CAs can either verify this by
checking a third-party database, such as who.is, or by
having the applicant send an email from one of the
five following email addresses:

7.

Issuing the Certificate: Upon successful validation of the
requesting organizations identify, an EV certificate is
sent by email.

Figure 1. Validation Steps Taken by CA to Verify the Identity of EV Certificate Purchasers

If the processes used by trusted CAs to verify the identity

user and their browser.1 Illegal online markets that populate

of the requesting party can be spoofed, malicious actors

the dark web may support malicious actors’ efforts to

can be issued an EV SSL/TLS certificate that delivers

obtain authentic EV certificates and establish “legitimate”

the highest levels of trust. This allows attackers to create

identities for the spoofed websites they build (Kim et al.

malicious websites that appear more “trustworthy” to the

2017; Kozak et al. 2018).

1

It is no more difficult to identify malicious traffic from a DV and OV certified website and an EV certified website. The technical challenge is the same.
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The Availability of SSL/TSL Certificates on
Darknet Markets
Darknet markets offer the hardware, software and materials
needed to initiate all types of cybercrime (Yip et al. 2013).
The first report we published from this project (Maimon et al.

•

At least one vendor on BlockBooth promises to issue
certificates from reputable CAs. The seller also offers
forged documentation, which allows attackers to
present themselves as trusted U.S. or U.K. companies
for less than $2,000.

2019) disclosed the presence of underground online markets

However, in the absence of a rigorous validation of both

for SSL/TLS certificates. Specifically, we reported that:

the services and products offered by these darknet

•

Five of the Tor network markets observed by our
group offered a steady supply of SSL/TLS certificates,
along with a range of related services and products.

•

SSL/TLS certificates are often packaged with crimeware services and products, such as malicious websites

•

vendors, it is difficult to assess the risk posed to online
users by this market. Specifically, one may argue that this
issue should be of lower concern if the ads on the darknet
markets we have observed are posted by fraudsters who
are not delivering the promised commodity than if the
products are actually delivered. The second phase of our

and ransomware.

project explores whether darknet vendors deliver on their

Prices for certificates vary from $260 to $1,600,

well as assess the origin and quality of the products these

depending on the type of certificate and scope of
additional services offered.

promise to supply EV certificates to interested parties, as
vendors sell.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
To accomplish our research objective, we applied for an

search bar of each market. Exhibits 1–5 present several

Institutional Review Board2 approval for this research. Once

example ads our team was able to find between January

approval was granted, we dived into online markets and

and April 2019 (i.e., followed by the publication of our first

hacker forums that were active on the Tor network from

report (Maimon et al. 2019)).

October 2018–April 2019 and searched for “for sale”
listings of TLS certificates.

Consistent with the findings reported in (Maimon et al. 2019),
Exhibits 1–3 presents ads for SSL/TLS certificates which are

Our research team discovered close to 70 relevant online

packaged with malware and web design services. However,

market webpages on the Tor network. To explore for the

while Exhibits 1 and 2 present ads posted on Empire Market

presence of SSL- and TLS-related ads in each market, we

and Dream Market simultaneously, Exhibit 3 presents an ad

typed in “TLS certificates” and “SSL certificates” in the

posted on Bitify, a clearnet online market platform

Exhibit 1. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Malware Services on Empire Market

2

An institutional review board is a type of committee that applies research ethics by reviewing the methods proposed for research to ensure they are ethical.
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Exhibit 2. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Web Design Services on Dream Market

7

Exhibit 3. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Web Design Services on Bitify

Similarly, Exhibits 4–5 present ads posted by vendors

BlockBooth, a darknet market platform, Exhibit 5 presents

who promise to issue certificates from reputable CAs.

an ad posted on Bitify.

However, while Exhibit 4 presents an ad posted on

8

Exhibit 4. EV Certificates for U.K. and U.S. Companies BlockBooth—a Listing Platform
on Open Bazaar

Exhibit 5. EV Certificates for Australian Companies on Bitify

Upon discovery of the above ads, as well as other ads that

interactions with a darknet market vendor who advertised

are not reported here but are available from the authors

the issuance of SSL/TLS certificates along with a web design

upon request, we randomly contacted two vendors—one

service as well as our assessment of the product he provided

who advertised the issuance of SSL/TLS certificates along

to the group. Additionally, we elaborate on the interactions

with a web design service and the other who advertised

we had with a vendor who advertised EV certificates for sale

EV certificate for sale—in order to assess whether their

on both clearnet and darknet underground markets, detailing

advertisements are truthful. Below, we describe our

our assessment of the products provided.
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RESULTS
Case Study 1: Web Design Service for an

chose the package that was relevant to our needs in the

Online Retail Platform

context of this study and asked that our website include

Approaching and Building Trust
The vendor we approached with a request to design a
retail website with an EV certificate installed on it preferred
to be contacted by potential customers over Telegram.
Exhibit 6 presents a screenshot of the initial interaction
between our research group (in green) and the vendor
(in white). Since the vendor offered several services, we

a function that allows a user to open an account, log in
with a username and password and provide a response to
a CAPTCHA.3 We also asked for an EV certificate to be
installed on the website. When we asked the vendor what
our new website could be used for, the response we got
suggested utilizing it as a platform to run online scams and
steal targets’ cookies and passwords.

Exhibit 6. Approaching a Vendor Over Telegram

Negotiating

methods of payment were money transfers to either a

The vendor’s response to our first query was prompt.

PayPal account or a Bitcoin wallet. An installment plan was

After receiving our requirements for the desired website

agreed upon (to build trust), and the first payment was

and the need for an EV certificate, the vendor mentioned

sent to the vendor.

that an annual fee will be required to install and maintain
the certificate. An updated price (between $200–$400)
was sent to us with an agreement to use an escrow
service4 to complete the business transaction. The vendor
promised that the complete website, including the EV
certificate installed on it, would be delivered within two
weeks from the time of payment. The vendor’s available

3

Product Arrival
A link to our newly purchased website arrived over
Telegram about eight days after we sent our first payment.
Exhibit 7 presents a screenshot of this website. We deleted
the website URL as well as few other identifying details in
effort to protect our team’s safety.

CAPTCHA is a type of challenge–response test used in computing to determine whether the user is human or a bot.

Online escrow service is a third-party website/platform which could be used to securely conduct online transactions. Specifically, this service allows customers to
avoid sending their payments directly to a seller, and instead to an Escrow company. The use of an escrow company services insure that it is only after the customer
has received the product funds will be released to the seller.
4
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Exhibit 7. Website Designed by Darknet Vendor and Delivered to Research Team

Quality and Authenticity Assessment

In order to assess whether the DV certificate was installed

To assess the quality of the product we received from the

on the website by mistake, we contacted the vendor and

vendor, we performed two checks. First, we attempted

asked him to explain why an EV certificate was not installed

to establish an account on the website, and second, we

on the website. The vendor replied the following day and

examined the type of TLS certificate that was installed.

explained the DV certificate is installed on the website

Results from these investigations yielded two key findings:
1.

Although creating an account on the new website was
feasible, no CAPTCHA banner was prompted to a

2.

temporarily, until the EV certificate is delivered and installed.
However, in order for the EV certificate to be installed, we
were asked by the vendor to send the second payment
installment directly to his Bitcoin wallet; we were promised

user who attempted to log in to the account.

that the funding would be used to cover the EV certificate

The type of TLS certificate installed on the website

the vendor disappeared and stopped responding to our

was of a DV type and not EV. Exhibit 8 presents a
screenshot of the certificate installed on the website.

costs. Unsurprisingly, once we paid the second installment,
queries and messages.

11

Exhibit 8. DV Certificate Installed on the Website Designed by a Darknet Vendor
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Case Study 2: Obtaining EV Certificates for

The vendor we approached with a request to purchase EV

U.K.-Based Organizations

certificates preferred to be contacted by potential customers

Retail Website

via email, Skype or Telegram. By investigating this vendor’s

Approaching and Building Trust
After our experience working with the previous vendor, we
were keen to find a vendor with whom we could establish
greater trust. Online markets allow people to rate vendors and
disclose their transactions, which helps increase trust among
potential customers. We were eager to find a vendor with an
established presence on both clearnet and darknet markets.

group of followers on one of the markets,5 our research
team was able to map the online social network of the
vendor and assess the online business ecosystem within
which EV certificates were being sold.6 Figure 2 presents the
first order (i.e., users followed by or being followed by the
vendor directly) and second order (i.e., users followed by or
being followed by the vendor’s followers) connections of the
vendor we approached (market with large blue circle).

Figure 2. Vendor First and Second-Order Connections (N = 742)

Nodes highlighted are those with greatest betweenness centrality. Colors indicate the communities (subgroups) that nodes belong to.
Communities rely on the Girvan-Newman algorithm, which identifies groups of individuals who have in-group connections and few outgroup connections.
5

Similar to social media platforms like Twitter, some clearnet and darknet platforms allow users to “follow” and be “followed” by other users of the platform.

Unfortunately, we couldn’t create a similar social network for the first vendor discussed in Case Study 1 due to absence of relevant information in the market
platform that was employed by the vendor.
6
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All in all, the overall size of the vendor social network is

Negotiating

composed of 742 actors; 65 vendors and customers are

Drawing on our experience with the first vendor, we decided

directly connected to the vendor and another 677 are

to request that the second vendor provide an EV certificate

following or are being followed by the vendor’s followers.

for a basic retail website we had created, which could

Importantly, three key vendors seem to be central to this

support potential customers’ online payments for various

network. Those three key vendors are represented by

products they could buy directly from the website. We

large red, green and light green circles. The large red circle

insisted on using an online escrow company service in this

(306 followers and following) represents a vendor who

transaction and asked whether we could be given a discount.

specializes in selling soft and hard illegal drugs (for example,

The vendor agreed to work with an online escrow company

Dutch MDMA crystals, Colombian cocaine and “Green

but refused to provide a discount, explaining that this

Heineken” ecstasy). Some of the countries this vendor

operation is performed by a group of people. Accordingly,

serves include Germany, U.K., Poland, Canada, Australia and

each member of the team is charged with handling different

Brazil. The large green dot (288 followers and following)

aspects of the operation, including verification and issuance

represents a vendor who specializes in selling counterfeit

of the certificates. The vendor assured the research team

brand products from China (for example, sunglasses and

that his group is experienced and disclosed that he has

wallets). Finally, the large light green circle (238 followers

successfully completed many projects in the past. Our

and following) represents a vendor claiming to be a small

request for an installment plan was approved.

business from Canada (Quebec) that specializes in selling
seeds (almonds, pumpkins, cranberries and cashews).
This social network demonstrates that both legitimate
and illegitimate actors may have exposure to the unique
underground market of TLS certificates.

Modus Operandi
Once agreement was reached between our group and the
vendor, we were asked to provide an entity name and URL
link for the website on which the EV certificate should be
installed. The requested information was sent to the vendor,

Consistent with the platform used for contacting the

along with our first payment. The vendor thanked us and

first vendor, this vendor preferred to be contacted over

promised to be in touch within a few days.

Telegram. We shared a request to explore a potential
purchase of an EV certificate for a U.K.-based retail website
at first, and the vendor responded rapidly. He indicated that
the prices advertised on the ad (between $1,000–$1,500)
are lower than the actual prices he charges for those
certificates and that the price varies based on the (1)
type of retail the certificate would be used for, (2) the
issuing CA and (3) the country in which the certificate will
be issued. Depending on the customer’s needs and the
order level of complexity, the time it takes to complete an
order can very from a few days up to a month and a half.
Payment could only be made using cryptocurrency coins,
such as Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ethereum.

Several days after we placed the order, our group received
a dossier of official documents from the Registrar of
Companies in England and Wales. The documents enclosed
indicated the formation of a new company, which carried
the entity name we provided to the vendor in the U.K.
(importantly, although we received a digital copy of these
documents, a hard copy version could also be mailed to
a physical address). Exhibits 9 and 10 present two of the
three official certificates we received from the vendor. In
addition to the new company name, these documents
included the names of the filing individual, as well as a
physical address for the new company.7 Those details were
cross-verified with the U.K. Companies House website
(www.companieshouse.gov.uk) and were found to exist on
those official databases.

We removed sensitive details from the two documents shown in Exhibits 9 and 10 in order to protect the safety and privacy of all personal involved in this
research both as subjects and as researchers.
7
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Exhibit 9. Certificate of Incorporation Document for a U.K.-Based Retail Website

Exhibit 10. Certificate of Registration for U.K.-Based Retail Website
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In an effort to increase the legitimacy of the new retail

records worldwide. Exhibit 11 presents a screenshot of

entity he created, the vendor also obtained a Data

the new entity record on the Dun and Bradstreet website.

Universal Numbering System (D-U-N-S) number from

Importantly, the physical address reported on Dun and

Dun and Bradstreet, a U.S.-based company that provides

Bradstreet’s website for the entity matches the one

commercial data, analytics and insights for businesses and

reported on the U.K. Companies House website.

maintains a database of more than 300 million business

Exhibit 11. Registration of U.K.-Based Retail Company on the Dun and Bradstreet Website

Upon receiving these documents, the second installment

an official request for an EV certificate was submitted by

was sent to the vendor. In addition, and per the vendor’s

the vendor to the CA. Exhibit 12 presents the confirmation

request, we allowed the vendor access to the email server

email we received for the EV certificate request submitted

on which our website was installed. It was at that time that

by the vendor.
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Exhibit 12. Conformation Email from CA for the Receipt of an EV Certificate Request to
be Installed on a U.K.-Based Retail Website

Several days followed after the confirmation email, and

an EV certificate to our U.K.-based retail website, along

after a series of confirmation activities taken by the

with the EV certificate. Exhibit 13 presents a screenshot

vendor, we received an approval email for the issuance of

of the email.

Exhibit 13. Confirmation Email from CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate Request

Once the EV certificate was approved, the vendor notified

Exhibit 14 presents a screenshot of the website prior to the

the research team and asked for the final payment

installation of the EV certificate, and Exhibit 15 shows the

installment. We then installed the certificate on the website.

website after the installation of the EV certificate.
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Exhibit 14. U.K.-Based Retail Website Appearance Prior to the Installation of an EV
Certificate Presenting No Padlock and Company Location

Exhibit 15. U.K.-Based Retail Website Appearance Presenting a Green Padlock and
Company Location After the Installation of an EV Certificate
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Quality and Authenticity Assessment

As may be observed in Exhibit 15, the installation of the

To assess the quality of the product we received from the

EV certificate on our website resulted in the appearance

vendor, we performed two checks.

of the green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the

First, we checked for the presence of the green padlock
icon and the new entity name in the address bar. Second,
we searched for the website identity and technical details of
the EV certificate, which are disclosed on the website.

new entity name was also showing to the right of the
green padlock (this detail is deleted from the image
in order to protect the safety of both the vendor and
research team). Exhibit 16 presents a screenshot of the
EV certificate details, as disclosed on the website. Note
that the details enclosed by this banner reveal the validity
and truthfulness of the certificate.

Exhibit 16. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.K.-Based Retail Website
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Financial Institution
Approaching
The vendor’s success in delivering an EV certificate for the
U.K.-based retail website was surprising to our group. This
vendor and his team obviously have a proficient process
for obtaining real EV certificates for non-existent entities.

EV certificate for the second website focused on the use
of an online escrow company in this transaction as well
as a payment installment plan. Our requests to work with
an escrow company and for an installment plan were
approved by the vendor. No discount was provided for the
initial selling price.

We wanted to test this further by seeing if the vendor

Modus Operandi

would issue a certificate for a nonexistent financial services

Once agreement was reached between our group and the

institution, as this is a highly regulated industry. A financial

vendor, we were asked to provide both an entity name and

services website, such as one for a bank or payday loan

URL link for the website on which the EV certificate should

company, could be used to steal even more sensitive

be installed. The requested information was sent to the

information—including salary, address, bank details and so

vendor, along with the first payment installment.

forth. This would make it an even more valuable phishing
site than a retail site.

A few days after we placed the order, our group received
a dossier of official documents from the Registrar of

Moreover, since the vendor advertised in his post that his

Companies in England and Wales, which indicated the

team could deliver EV certificates from several CAs, we

formation of a new company that carried the entity

wondered if a similar modus operandi would be followed

name we provided to the vendor (we have not provided

in obtaining an EV certificate from a different CA than the

screenshots of those pieces of documentation in this report

one used for the retail shop case. Therefore, we reached

since they are similar to those presented in Exhibits 9 and

out to the vendor again and asked him to provide us with a

10). The documents included the new financial institution

quote for a U.K.-based online payday loan website.

name and the name of the filing individual, as well as a

The vendor responded to our inquiry by emphasizing that
the verification for financial-type websites is longer than
the one for the retail website and requires more work

physical address for the new company. Those details were
cross-verified with the U.K. Companies House website and
were found to exist on this official database.

and team effort. However, he assured us that his team

To check whether a D-U-N-S number was issued for the

had experience issuing EV certificates for a wide range

new financial institution, we visited the Dun and Bradstreet

of websites, including shopping, digital products, hosting

website (https://www.dnb.com/) and searched the databases

companies, and even investment and bank websites. The

for evidence indicating the formation of our new company.

price for this work was significantly higher and ranged

Exhibit 17 presents a screenshot of the new entity record

between $10,000–$15,000.

on the website. The physical address reported on the Dun

Negotiation
Similar to the negotiation we had with this vendor during

and Bradstreet website for the entity was similar to the one
reported on the U.K. Companies House website.

the first purchase of an EV certificate, negotiation for an

20

Exhibit 17. Registration of U.K.-Based Financial Institution on Dun and Bradstreet Website

Upon receipt of these documents, we sent the second

few days after the confirmation email, and after a series

installment to the vendor. In addition, and per the

of confirmation activities were taken by the vendor, we

vendor’s request, we allowed the vendor access to the

received an approval email for the issuance of an EV

email server on which our financial website was installed.

cer tificate to our U.K.-based financial website, along with

It was at that time that an official request for an EV

the EV cer tificate. Exhibit 18 presents a screenshot of

cer tificate was submitted by the vendor to the CA. A

the email.

Exhibit 18. Conformation Email from a CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate Request
for a U.K.-Based Financial Institution Website
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Once the EV certificate was approved, we were notified

As may be observed in Exhibit 19, the installation of the EV

by the vendor and asked to send the final installment. We

certificate on our website resulted in the appearance of the

then installed the certificate on the website and checked its

green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the new entity

quality and authenticity.

name also showed to the right of the green padlock (this

Quality and Authenticity Assessment
In line with our assessment of the first EV certificate we

detail is deleted from the image in order to protect the
safety of both the vendor and research team).

received from the vendor, we first checked for the presence
of the green padlock icon and the new entity name in the
address bar.

Exhibit 19. U.K.-Based Financial Institution Website Appearance After the Installation of
an EV Certificate

We also searched for the EV certificate details, which are

Note that the details enclosed by this banner reveal the

disclosed on the website. Exhibit 20 presents a screenshot

validity of the certificate.

of the EV certificate details, as disclosed on the website.
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Exhibit 20. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.K.-Based Financial
Institution Website
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Case Study 2: US
Approaching and Building Trust
The vendor’s success in delivering two EV certificates for
U.K.-based businesses’ websites was concerning to our
group. However, since the vendor advertised his team
could deliver EV certificates from numerous CAs in several
countries, we wondered if a similar method of operation

negotiation for the purchase of an EV certificate for the
U.S.-based website focused on our team’s desire to use
an online escrow company in this transaction as well as
a payment installment plan. Our requests to work with
an escrow company and for an installment plan were
approved by the vendor. No discount was provided for the
initial selling price.

would be employed while obtaining an EV certificate to

Modus Operandi

a financial institution website that operates in the U.S.

Once an agreement was reached between our group

Therefore, we reached out to the vendor again and asked

and the vendor, we were asked by the vendor to provide

him to provide us with a quote for a U.S.-based online

both an entity name and URL link for the website on

loans and payday website.

which the EV certificate should be installed. The requested

The vendor responded to our inquiry by emphasizing that
the verification for a financial-type website in the U.S. would
be complicated and would require a larger team than the
one operated in the U.K. Verification for the company
would have to be done using official documentation from
Delaware, and the price for obtaining an EV certificate
for a U.S.-based financial institution would range between
$6,000–$8,500. The vendor reassured our team that his
group is quite experienced working in the U.S.
Negotiating
Consistent with the negotiation we had with this

information was sent to the vendor, along with the first
payment. A few days after we placed the order, our
group received a dossier of official documents from the
Division of Corporations in Delaware, which indicated the
formation of a new company that carried the entity name
we provided to the vendor. Exhibits 21 and 22 present
the two official documents we received from the vendor.
The documents included the new financial institution
name and the name of the filing individual, as well as a
physical address for the new company. Those details were
cross-verified with the website and were found to exist
on those official databases.

vendor during our previous purchases of EV certificates,

Exhibit 21. Certificate of Formation Document for a U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website
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Exhibit 22. Statement of Authorized Person to U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website

To check whether a D-U-N-S number was issued for

Exhibit 23 presents a screenshot of the new entity record

the new financial institution, we visited the Dun and

on the website. The physical address reported on the Dun

Bradstreet website and searched the databases for

and Bradstreet’s website for the entity was similar to the

evidence indicating the formation of our new company.

one reported in the Delaware Division of Corporations.

Exhibit 23. Registration of U.S.-Based Financial Institution on Dun and Bradstreet Website
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Upon receipt of these documents, we sent the second

A few days after the confirmation email and a series of

installment to the vendor. In addition, and per the vendor’s

confirmation activities taken by the vendor, we received

request, we allowed the vendor access to the email

an approval email for the issuance of an EV certificate

server on which our financial institution website was

to our U.S.-based financial institution website, along with

installed. It was at that time that an official request for an

the EV certificate. Exhibit 24 presents a screenshot of the

EV certificate was submitted by the vendor to the CA.

approval email.

Exhibit 24 Conformation Email from a CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate
Request for a U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website

Once the EV certificate was approved, we were notified by

As may be observed in Exhibit 25, the installation of the EV

the vendor and asked to send the final installment. We then

certificate on our website resulted in the appearance of the

installed the certificate on the website and checked the

green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the new entity

quality and authenticity of the certificate.

name also showed to the right of the green padlock (this

Quality and Authenticity Assessment
In line with our assessment of the previous EV certificates
we received from the vendor, we first checked for the
presence of the green padlock icon and the new entity
name in the address bar.

detail is deleted from the image in order to protect the safety
of both the vendor and research team). We also searched for
the EV certificate details which are disclosed on the website.
Exhibit 26 presents a screenshot of the EV certificate details,
as disclosed on the website. Note that the details enclosed
by this banner reveal the validity of the certificate.
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Exhibit 25. U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website Appearance After the Installation
of an EV Certificate

27

Exhibit 26. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.S.-Based Financial
Institution Website
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DISCUSSION
An EV SSL/TLS certificate is designed to be the most

Specifically, our findings verify James Burton’s (2017)

trusted certificate on the market and is issued by CAs that

experiment yet take it to the next level by exposing that at

follow a rigorous validation process aimed at identifying

least one organized crime group now gets EV certificates

the requester’s true identity. Specifically, the CA/Browser

from a legitimate CA and sells them on both clearnet and

Forum and Microsoft guidelines for obtaining an EV

darknet markets. Burton’s suggestion that malicious actors

certificate require that the requester provide multiple

could get access to credentials off the dark web, use those

pieces of identifying information, including the company’s

to set up a fake company and then purchase a fake domain

D-U-N-S number (unique numeric identifiers assigned

and an EV SSL to secure that domain, is now a reality, which

to a single business entity) or a letter from a certified

law enforcement agencies and governmental agencies such

public accountant who can verify the legitimacy of the

as the Federal Trade Commission should address.

business, when a certificate is requested. After submitting
the request, the CA is required to authenticate the legal
existence and identity of the requesting party by verifying
the company’s trade name and its operational and physical
existence, as well as its ownership of the domain name.

Based on these findings, we believe CAs could do more
to validate the authenticity of individuals and organizations
purchasing EV certificates to ensure they retain their
value. For example, a more thorough verification of the
EV certificate purchaser’s physical presence could be

Evidence presented in this report indicates that at least

followed. Exhibits 27 and 28 present the street view from

one international organized crime group has been able

the addresses that appeared in the registration documents

to exploit the unique problems embedded within the EV

and the Dun and Bradstreet database for the U.K.-based

validation process used by CAs, and this group is able to

retail and financial companies. Exhibit 29 presents the

issue EV certificates for websites of nonexistent retail and

street view from the address that appeared in both the

financial institutions in both the U.K. and U.S. Specifically,

Delaware Division of Corporations registration documents

these online vendors harness their knowledge of CA

and the Dun and Bradstreet database for the U.S.-based

validation processes to sell EV certificates to interested

financial institution. Evaluating this data could improve the

parties. This discovery is a result of an extensive research

EV certificate validation process. Failure to adjust these

effort through which three EV certificates for nonexistent

processes calls into question the necessity of purchasing

retail and financial organizations were sold to our team.

EV certificates and their value in delivering additional levels

The findings presented in this report add to the ongoing
debate regarding the effectiveness and necessity of EV
certificates in increasing trust among internet users.

of trust. Future improvements should take an evidencebased cybersecurity approach and include consistent tests
that evaluate potential problems and weaknesses in the
validation process.
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Exhibit 27. Street View from the U.K. Retail Company’s Address Submitted to
Authorities by Vendor and Appeared on Certificate of Registration Document from
Google Maps

Exhibit 28. Street View from U.K.-Based Financial Institution’s Address Submitted to
Authorities by Vendor and Appeared on Certificate of Registration Document from
Google Maps
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Exhibit 29. Actual Site on U.S.-Based Financial Institution’s Address, Which Was
Submitted to Authorities by Vendor from Google Maps

An evidence-based cybersecurity approach provides an

the cyber realm, and that the effectiveness of the different

ideal framework for conceptualizing an interdisciplinary

interventions in achieving its goals should be assessed

problem like online crime because it stresses moving

through rigorous scientific research methods. Seeking

beyond decision makers’ political, financial and social

to collect and produce evidence from each of the key

backgrounds as well as personal experiences to a model

junctures formed through the online interaction between

in which policy decisions are made based on scientific

the different actors that operate on the cybercrime

research findings. Moreover, this approach draws on

ecosystem and drive CA online fraud victimization will

the assumption that solutions to human behaviors may

result in a more effective validation process. In turn,

be affected by the interconnected behavior of victims,

this will allow effective prevention and mitigation of

offenders and law enforcement agencies operating within

cybercrime incidents.
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